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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
found that when the employer used the company premises and
company time to make an antiunion speech to the employees, he
"created a glaring imbalance in organizational communication." The
Board then ruled that the employer could give such speeches but that
he was under an obligation, in order to allow a proper balance to -
be maintained, to accede to the union's request to address the em-
ployees under similar circumstances 8
After May, the status of the law was that the NLRB was im-
posing an "equal time" rule on an employer only in retail department
store cases and then only when the employer had in effect a broad,
but privileged, no-solicitation rule. In other cases a union request
for equal opportunity to address the employees has been refused
where other avenues of approach have been open.3 7 Excelsior
seems to make an inroad on this practice since awarding the union
a mailing list goes far toward putting it on a par with the employer.
In General Elec. Corp.,"8 decided the same day as Excelsior,
the Board was asked to apply its department store rule of "equal
time" to the industry in general. It refused, primarily because of its
Excelsior ruling, saying that
[I]n light of the increased opportunities for employees' access
to communications which should flow from Excelsior, but with
which we have, as yet, no experience, ... we prefer to defer any
reconsideration of current Board doctrine in the area of plant
access until after the effects of Excelsior become known.3 9
After more than a year of NLRB administrative experience
with the Excelsior rule, it appears safe to assume the rule has re-
sulted in sufficient union accessability so that a stiffer rule is not
needed at this time. 0
GEORGE L. LiTTLE, JR.
Taxation-Interest Deductions-Sham and Business Purpose Tests
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides, "There shall be
allowed as a deduction all interest paid or accrued within the taxable
136 N.L.R.B. at 802.
'
TNLRB v. United Steelworkers of America [Nutone, Inc.], 357 U.S.
357 (1958).
'. 156 NLRB No. 112 (Feb. 4, 1966).
I8fd. at -.
40 See note 11 supra for cases in which the Board has sought to enforce
its Excelsior rule in federal district court.
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year on indebtedness."' Under this provision, interest is deductible
without regard to whether the indebtedness is incurred in a trade
or business, in connection with a profit-making activity, or in a
purely personal matter.2 The section, on its face, would allow de-
duction of all interest paid by any taxpayer, corporate or individual,
with respect to a loan transaction between the taxpayer and lending
agency.8 Through several rationales the federal courts have im-
posed a "judicial amendment" on this section by which interest
deductions are disallowed if the taxpayer could realize an economic
gain only because of a reduction in taxes. These rationales have
hinged, entirely or partially, on the courts' finding an absence of
genuine indebtedness. A recent trend is to refrain from using this
fiction of a lack of indebtedness and to base deductibility on the
circumstances motivating the taxpayer to enter the loan arrangement.
The courts have imposed various, but somewhat analogous, tests
to prohibit such deductions. One test, dating from pre-1960, in-
volves a fiction by which the courts refuse to recognize a bona fide
creditor-debtor relationship within the intent of the code. In 1960
a business purpose test was introduced to disallow an interest de-
duction if a transaction has no economic reality beyond a potential
tax deduction, but this test has been clouded by continued insistence
that genuine indebtedness is not present. A recent case4 recognizes
an actual indebtedness and applies the business purpose test without
regard to the nature of the loan manipulation.
The pre-1960 test, which has continued to be applied in some
circuits, may be divided into two categories. In the first the courts
find a lack of indebtedness, resulting from the relationship of the
parties, where there is no apparent intention that the transaction be
binding on the parties. This is illustrated by Woodward v. United
States5 where the taxpayer made his wife a gift of insurance policies
on his life. The wife later assigned the policies back to the taxpayer
pursuant to a plan of placing the policies in trust for the wife and a
'INT. Rxv. CoDE of 1954, § 163(a).
STANLEY & KILCULLEN, TEE FEDERAL INcoME TAX § 163 (4th ed.
1961). The section also states, "Sec. 163 (Interest) states somewhat too
broadly that all interest paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebted-
ness is deductible."3 Deductibility of interest paid by a taxpayer with respect to his obligation
to a third party, where the original loan transaction was between the lend-
ing agency and the third party, will not be considered.
Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
'208 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1953).
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son. The taxpayer executed demand notes, equal to the cash value
of the policies, payable to his wife and claimed deductions for the
interest purportedly paid. In disallowing the deductions, the court
found that there was no indebtedness and that the money paid was
still the taxpayer's. It labeled the arrangement as camouflage and
as acts of benevolence.6
The second category involves transactions, both arm's length
and collusive, that are treated as shams, therefore failing to create
indebtedness within the intent of the statutory deduction. In Jock-
mus v. United States7 the taxpayer procured 1,000,000 dollars face
amount United States Treasury Notes for a purchase price of 973,750
dollars. In plan, the taxpayer bought the notes from a securities
corporation that purchased them from the original seller and de-
livered them to a finance and loan corporation (Corporate). Cor-
porate loaned taxpayer the purchase price secured by the treasury
notes. Meanwhile, Corporate directed a brokerage firm to make a
short sale of 1,000,000 dollars in treasury notes which was accom-
plished by sale to the original seller. In actuality, the original seller
delivered the notes to an exchange bank and then accepted redelivery
of the same notes. All of the other transactions, except the taxpayer's
promissory note to Corporate, were book entries only, and no money
changed hands. Taxpayer borrowed 30,000 dollars from another
finance and loan corporation (Court) and prepaid Corporate 41,384
dollars interest on the purchase price loan. The brokerage firm
contrived the scheme, created Corporate as a loaning agency "front"
with very limited capital, and controlled Court.
The court disallowed the interest deduction after finding a lack
of a bona fide creditor-debtor relationship' as evidenced by Cor-
porate's failure to advance funds or to obtain possession of the notes
as security and by the intricate manipulations completely cancelling
each other. Rather than a loan arrangement, the resulting obligation
was labeled a contractual right to future delivery of the securities
upon payment of an agreed price which was the amount of the pur-
ported loan.
' Cf., Foresun, Inc. v. Commissioner, 348 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1965).
7335 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1964).
'See, e.g., Dooley v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1964);
Gheen v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1964); Lewis v. Commis-
sioner, 328 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 821 (1964);
Nichols v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1963); Goodstein v.
Commissioner, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959).
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Taxpayer in Jockmus contended this transaction should be al-
lowed since it was an arm's length transaction with the arrange-
ments made by the brokerage firm, rather than by the taxpayer.9
The court refused to distinguish the case from Lynch v. Commis-
sioner'" where interest deductions were disallowed in a similar plan
but where the prearranged collusive scheme was known to and
directed by the taxpayer. 1
The case law in this area was expanded when the business pur-
pose test, as applied to interest deductions, was advanced in Knetsch
v. United States."2 During 1953 the taxpayer purchased ten, thirty-
year, 400,000-dollar face amount, single premium annuity bonds,
bearing interest at two and one-half per cent annually, for an initial
outlay of 4,000 dollars. The remaining purchase obligation was
met by taxpayer "borrowing" 4,000,000 dollars from the insurance
company, executing three and one-half per cent notes secured by the
annuity bonds, and prepaying interest of 140,000 dollars. The
annuity contract enabled the taxpayer to keep the cash or loan value
reduced to 1,000 dollars by borrowing against each year's incre-
mental increase at the beginning of the year in which the increase
was to be realized. Five days after the initial purchase, the taxpayer
borrowed 99,000 dollars of the first year's scheduled increase with
a further prepayment of interest. Similar borrowing in 1954 and
9Accord, MacRae v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961), where
the court disallowed the deductions in an "arm's length transaction" and
also stated that the payments made were in reality consideration for tax
deductions, not for loans, hence, were not deductible as interest under the
code. Contra, L. Lee Stanton, 34 T.C. 1 (1960).
10273 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1959).
"
1The court relied on the often cited phrase, "Save in those instances
where the statute itself turns on intent, a matter so real as taxation must
depend on objective realities, not on the varying subjective beliefs of in-
dividual taxpayers." 335 F.2d at 28.
12364 U.S. 361 (1960). The district court rendered judgment for the
United States by disallowing the deduction and the court of appeals affirmed.
272 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1959). The Supreme Court granted certiorari due
to a suggested conflict with United States v. Bond, 258 F.2d 577 (5th Cir.
1958), where deductions were upheld upon a finding that the transaction
appeared, in form, to be what the statute intended, i.e., interest paid on
indebtedness, and despite the realities of the transaction.
A sidelight to the Knetsch affair is the taxpayer's later attempt to
deduct his out-of-pocket costs, under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165(c) (2),
as a loss sustained in a transaction entered into for profit or, alternatively,
under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 212 as an ordinary and necessary expense
incurred in the management and maintenance of property held for the
production of income. The deduction was disallowed on both grounds in
Knetsch v. United States, 172 Ct. CI. 378, 348 F.2d 932 (1965).
1967]
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1955 maintained the cash and loan value at 1,000 dollars. In 1956
he terminated the contract, surrendered the bonds, obtained can-
cellation of his indebtedness, and received the 1,000 dollars cash
surrender value. For taxable years 1953 and 1954, the only taxable
years involved, the taxpayer paid 290,570 dollars as interest, received
203,000 dollars in loans, and attempted to realize a tax savings of
233,297 dollars by deduction of interest.
The Supreme Court applied a business purpose test by which
an interest deduction is disallowed if no economic gain is realized,
or could be realized, beyond a tax deduction. The Court stated that
the tax reduction motive or intent is immaterial and that the de-
terminative question is "whether what was done, apart from the tax
motive, was the thing which the statute intended."'- This statutory
intent as to indebtedness was found to be lacking since the taxpayer
did not appreciably affect his beneficial interest except to reduce
taxes.
While Knetsch added another rule to the Commissioner's reper-
tory for disallowing interest deductions, its inherent value was
weakened by the Court's further finding of no genuine indebtedness
and, particularly, by its labeling the transaction as a sham. It has
been suggested that a finding of sham is not compatible with a busi-
ness purpose test."4 The reasoning is that an indebtedness is not
recognized in sham transactions, while a business purpose test should
be applicable irrespective of a valid creditor-debtor relationship.
The uncertainty ensuing from the dual standard articulated in
Knetsch is illustrated by Bridges v. Commissioner.5 The taxpayer
purchased 500,000 dollars face amount treasury notes for 486,875
dollars. A bank loaned 500,000 dollars on his promissory note, se-
cured by the treasury notes, and the taxpayer prepaid interest of
19,687 dollars. A brokerage firm obtained the notes, arranged the
financing, and forwarded the notes to the bank. The bank sold the
notes at maturity and cancelled the indebtedness. Taxpayer's only
involvement was signing the promissory notes. He claimed the in-
terest as a deduction in 1956, when his adjusted gross income was
" 364 U.S. at 365. The Court adopted the business purpose test invoked
to disallow capital gains treatment for securities distributed in a corporate
liquidation in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
' Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of
Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 TuI. L. Rav. 355 (1963); Note, 46
CORNELL L.Q. 649 (1961).
"325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963).
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95,582 dollars, and reported 13,125 dollars as a long-term capital
gain in 1957.
The court, relying on Knetsch, discussed the absence of a bene-
ficial gain other than a tax deduction but seemed to support its dis-
allowance of the deductions by finding that no genuine indebtedness
existed and that the transaction was a sham. The court pointed to
the taxpayer's outlay of more funds than he could possibly receive
by an acceleration in value of the securities and emphasized that
he never had uncontrolled use of the additional money, of the se-
curities, or of the interest on the securities.
The potential of the business purpose test, divorced from the
sham aspects, began to emerge in Minchin v. Commissioner.'0 The
taxpayer prepaid interest on the purchase price loan for two ten-year,
200,000 dollar, single premium annuity contracts, the sole security
for the loan. The annuity contracts provided for reduced interest on
the loans after the sixth year and for deferment of the loan repay-
ment until just prior to maturity of the annuities. The court relied
on Knetsch and the business purpose test to disallow the interest
deduction.' 7 Due to the shorter deferred period and reduced interest
payments after the sixth year, the court expressed doubt about the
lack of genuine indebtedness aspects and did not call the transaction
a sham. It adopted the view that such a net actual loss places the
burden of showing the economic reality of the transaction on the
taxpayer.
The business purpose test reached full bloom, unfettered by a
sham stigma, in Goldstein v. Commissioner"' where the taxpayer won
a 1958 Irish Sweepstakes of 140,000 dollars. Apart from the
sweepstakes proceeds, taxpayer and her husband had an income of
904 dollars for 1958. She borrowed 945,000 dollars in December
1958, purchased 1,000,000 dollars face amount Treasury Notes,
pledged the notes as collateral for the loan, and prepaid interest of
81,396 dollars. The Tax Court,' following Knetsch, found as an
1335 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1964). The Knetsch and Minchin litigation
should be unnecessary today due to INT. Rzv. CoDE or 1954 § 264(a) (2)
which disallows deduction of "any amount paid or accrued on indebtedness
incurred or continued to purchase or carry a single premium life insurance,
endowment, or annuity contract" This provision is only applicable to
annuity contracts purchased after March 1, 1954.
"
7Accord, Kaye v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 40 (9th Cir. 1961).
18364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
Kapel Goldstein, 44 T.C. 284 (1965). For a student note on the Tax
Court decision, see 19 VAxD. L. Rav. 194 (1965).
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ultimate fact that the taxpayer's purpose was not to derive an eco-
nomic gain but solely to secure a large interest deduction as an
offset to the sweepstakes proceeds, and held the transaction to be
a sham.
The court of appeals rejected the sham or bona fide creditor-
debtor rationale by pointing out that an actual loan arrangement
existed which was indistinguishable from any other legitimate loan
transaction. It found a transaction that had no substance, utility,
or purpose beyond the tax deduction and stated that a deduction
should not be allowed "when it objectively appears that a taxpayer
has borrowed funds in order to engage in a transaction that has no
substance or purpose aside from the taxpayer's desire to obtain the
tax benefit of an interest deduction."20 The court, further, appeared
to adopt the dissenting view of Gilbert v. Commissioner2' where
Judge Learned Hand expressed his dislike of labeling transactions
as "no substantial economic reality," "sham," or "dependent on the
substance of the transaction" to bring them within the intent of the
tax statutes and proposed a test that would turn on the taxpayer's
motives at the time of entering the transaction 22
Application of the Goldstein view would result in disallowance
of any interest deduction, irrespective of the type of loan manipula-
tions, where it objectively appears that the taxpayer had no antici-
pation of an economic gain other than a tax benefit. By recognizing
that an actual indebtedness exists, this view considers the realities
of a loan obligation between creditor and debtor, which the previous
tests glossed over, and avoids the fiction that no such genuine situa-
tion is present. It is still open for the taxpayer to obtain his de-
duction by showing that he entered the transaction as a purposive
activity, to be financed through borrowing, with a reasonable ex-
pectation of economic gains.
In approximately seven years since its introduction into the inter-
est deduction area, the business purpose test has evolved from an
initial association with the sham considerations to a complete separa-
tion of these approaches and rejection of the sham test. The other
. Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 734, 741 (2d Cir. 1966).21248 F.2d 399, 410 (2d Cir. 1957) (L. Hand, J., dissenting). The
majority disallowed deduction of a bad debt claim.
. Id. at 412 where Judge Hand stated, "When the petitioners decided
to make their advances in the form of debts, rather than of capital advances,
did they suppose that the difference would appreciably affect their beneficial
interests in the venture, other than taxwise."
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federal courts should adopt the independent application of this testm
which enables a more realistic evaluation of the taxpayer's motives
and the statutory intent in determining the deductibility of interest.
WILLIAm H. THomPsoN
Torts-Medical Malpractice-Rejection of "But for" Test
In Hicks v. United States' a navy doctor failed to test for bowel
obstruction in a patient who complained of severe abdominal pains.
The patient, treated only for a "bug," died some eight hours later,
suffering from a strangulation of the intestine. On the basis of
expert testimony, the doctor was found to have been negligent in
failing to diagnose the obstruction. There was also testimony that
if a correct diagnosis had been made, an immediate operation would
have saved the patient's life. Testimony apparently was not given
to indicate whether an immediate operation could have been per-
formed or to indicate what dangers such an operation would have
involved, if any.' On the basis of this testimony the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit held that the trial judge was compelled
to find negligence and "cause in fact" and to award a verdict to the
plaintiff. The evidence of cause in fact is probably sufficient to meet
the orthodox tests, but the court apparently rejected the usual test
of cause in fact, saying that
When a defendant's negligent action or inaction has effectively
terminated a person's chance of survival, it does not lie in the
defendant's mouth to raise conjectures as to the measure of the
chances that he has put beyond the possibility of realization. If
there was any substantial possibility of survival and the defendant
has destroyed it, he is answerable.'
" The close family relationship will continue to pose a problem if it
appears the taxpayer was "borrowing" his own money. In this situation
the realities of a loan obligation may not be present.
1368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
The patient suffered from diabetes as well as from an "abnormal con-
genital peritoneal hiatus with internal herniation. . . ." Id. at 629. It seems
doubtful that a layman could estimate the likelihood or non-likelihood of
the patient's survival under these conditions, especially without knowing
whether qualified personnel were on hand to operate. Compare George v.
City of New York, 253 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1964) where a barium
enema penetrated the bowel wall; an operation was immediately performed,
but the patient died. Nevertheless, the testimony in Hicks that an operation
would probably have been successful is no doubt sufficient evidence of cause.
3368 F.2d at 632.
